The great inflation surge of 2021–23 is largely behind us. Headline CPI in most advanced economies has returned close to the 2% targets set by the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, and Bank of England. But "close" is not the same as "at target", and 2027 will test whether the final mile of disinflation can be completed — or whether structural forces push inflation back up.

1. Wage dynamics: the domestic price engine

Across the US, UK, and euro area, wage growth is running at 3.5–4.5% annually — above the pace consistent with 2% inflation in the services sector. As long as employment remains strong, workers have bargaining power, and services firms will continue passing wage costs into prices. The question is timing: will wage growth slow enough in 2027 to allow core services inflation to converge to target? The OECD Employment Outlook projects wage growth moderating to around 3% in advanced economies by end-2027 — compatible with 2% inflation, but only barely.

2. China's export deflation: a global disinflationary gift

China's economic slowdown is generating significant deflation in manufactured goods. With domestic demand weak, Chinese producers are cutting prices to sustain export market share. This is flowing through to global goods prices — goods CPI is negative or near zero across most advanced economies. However, this tailwind is temporary and politically contested: US tariffs and EU anti-dumping measures may reduce the deflationary impact. Any escalation in trade barriers would remove a key disinflationary cushion. See our China deflation analysis for the full picture.

3. Energy transition costs: the two-sided price story

The green energy transition creates both deflationary and inflationary pressures. Solar and wind costs have fallen dramatically — renewable electricity is now cheaper than fossil fuel power in most markets, pulling electricity prices down. But the transition also requires massive capital investment in grids, storage, and industrial electrification, which raises construction and industrial goods costs. Over 2027, the net effect on CPI is likely modestly disinflationary for energy (renewable cost pass-through) but inflationary for specific sectors (infrastructure-linked services). The IEA World Energy Outlook 2026 estimates the net price effect across OECD economies.

4. Housing: the stickiest component

Housing costs — rent and owners' equivalent rent — are the largest single component of CPI in both the US (about 35% of the basket) and the UK. Rent inflation peaked in late 2023 at 8–9% in the US and has since slowed, but it is still running at 4–5%. New leases are being signed at lower rent growth rates, and as these filter through to the CPI "stock" measure over 12–18 months, housing inflation will gradually fall. But any reversal in housing starts — from higher construction costs or zoning constraints — could reignite rent inflation. This is the single biggest upside risk to the "soft landing" scenario. Our housing costs explainer details how OER is measured.

5. Central bank easing divergence

The Fed, ECB, and BoE are all in easing mode, but at different paces. The ECB has cut the most aggressively (100 bp in 2026); the Fed has been more cautious (75 bp); the BoE is somewhere in between. If easing accelerates too quickly, it risks re-igniting demand-pull inflation. If too slow, it risks unnecessary economic weakness. The path of inflation expectations will be the arbiter: as long as 2-year and 5-year expectations remain anchored near 2%, central banks have room to ease. Our inflation explorer tracks current rates across all major economies in real time.